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W, ONE 
Introduction 
[An] invasion Jorce .. . oj digital signals marched across the border into 
Estonia .... 1 
ON APRIL 26. 2007. WHAT would become a two-week series of sustained digi-
tal attacks began on various components of Estonia's infrastructure.2 The 
attacks all took the form of what is known as a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack. 
In aDDoS attack. attackers overwhelm websites and servers by bombard-
ing them with data. or "traffic:' The attackers use a network of compromised 
computers-known as "zombies"-to send massive bursts of data at the tar-
gets of the attack. The zombies are computers that have been captured by 
"bots" -software that subtly and usually invisibly infil trates an individual's or 
a business' computer or one used by a governmental. educational. or other 
agency.:\ The owners of computers recruited into bot networks. or "botnets; 
usually have no idea their equipment is moonlighting as a minion of some 
more-or-less sinister force.4 
Because bot programs give attackers remote control of compromised 
computers. zombies can be anywhere. As we will see. geography is irrelevant 
1 Robin Bloor. Large-scale DOS Attack Menace Continues to Grow. The Register (June 11.2007). 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/1I1dos_security _ cyberwarfare/. 
2 See Mark Lander & John Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia. New York 
Times (May ~9. 2007). htt:p:llwww.nytimes.com/2oo7/05/29/technology/2gestonia.html? 
ex=1182484800&en=ac3eadbe88fdb21c&ei=5070. 
3 See Nicholas Ianelli & Aaron Hackworth. Botnets as a Vehicle for Online Crime. 
CERT Coordination Center (December 1. 2005). http://www.cert.orgiarchive/pdf/Botnets.pclf. 
For a good overview ofDDoS attacks and botnets. see MacAfee North America Criminology 
Report: Organized Crime a nd the Internet 2007. http://www.mcafee.com/uslIocaI30n-
tent/misc/na_criminologYjeport_07.pdf. 
4 See. e.g .. Brian Krebs. Bringing Botnets auto/the Shadows. Washington Post (March 21. 2006). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy nl co n I.e n tl article 12006/031211 AR20060321 
00279.htm1. 
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in cyberspace. So is size: Bot software is currently being used to assemble 
enormous transnational networks of slave computers. Botnets have grown 
almost exponential ly since they appeared a little more than a decade ago.s 
Early botnets averaged a few hundred computers, but by 2005, the average 
had risen to 1.000.6 In 2006, experts reported that the average botnet 
consisted of 20,000 zombies, with the median size being 45,000 computers; 
they noted, however, that they had also tracked at least a dozen botnets 
encompassing more than 100,000 slave computers.7 
In the Eston ian attacks, an estimated 1 million zombie computers were 
used. If true, it is far from unprecedented; Dutch authorities reported ly 
encountered a 1.5 million botnet a few years ago.s And the size only contin-
ues to increase; some foresee "super botnets" comprising millions of slave 
computers, while others say they are already here.9 In January 2007, one 
expert called botnets a "pandemic:' estimating that 25% of the world's 
networked computers-lSO million computers-could be zombies.1O 
Changes have been made in how botnets are structured. One innovation is 
"tiered" command and control, in whjch these functions are distributed across 
many ru[ferent, geograprucal ly dispersed computer servers. A tiered botnet 
operates more like a modern army-with distinct, distributed bot units and 
command structures-than like the earlier versions, which had a single point of 
command.11 And as with an army, the botnet's rustributed command structure 
5 See Peer-to-Peer Bolnets a new and Growing Threat, CSO (April 17, 2007), http://www2. 
csoonline .com/blo~view.html?CID=32852; Alexander Gostev, Malware Evolution: 
January-March 2005, Viruslist.com (April 18, 2005), http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis? 
pubid=162454316#botnets. 
6 See Robert Vamosi, What GoodAre 1,OOORemot"e-Controlied PCs?, CNET News (November 
24, 2005), http://www.cnet.com.au/software/security/0.239029558.240058520.00.htm. 
7 See The Botnet Trackers, Washington Post (February 16, 2006), http://www.washington-
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/16/ AR2006021601388.html . 
8 See Lander & Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in. Estonia, supra. See also 
Gregg Keizer, Dutch Botnet Suspects Ran l.5 Million Machines, Tech Web (October 21, 2005). 
http://www.techweb.com/wire/ security /172303160. 
9 See Ryan Vogt & John Aycock. Attack of the 50 Foot Botnet. Technical Heport 2006-846-39. 
Deparl.mentofComputer Science, University of Calgary (August 2006). http://pages.cpsc.ucal-
gary.ca/ Naycock/papers/50foot.pdf. See also Bot Counts, Shadow Server. http://www.shad-
owserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php?n=Stats.BotCounts (yearly botnet size for April-June 2007 
ranged between 2.5 and 3 million zombies). 
10 See Tim Weber, Crimin.als 'May Overwhelm the Web;' BBC News (January 25. 2007), 
http:// news. bbc.co.uk/2/h ilbusiness/6298641.stm. 
11 See Scott Berinato, Attack of the Bots, Wired (November 2006). http://www.wired.com/ 
wired/archive/14.11/botneL.htmJ?pg=3&topic=botnet&topic_set=. 
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makes it more resilient to attacks from its opponents. The most recent innovation 
is using peer-to-peer technology to replace centralized command and control 
structures with a nonhierarchical. purely distributed system; this means the 
botnet is not vulnerable to attacks on central control nodes. so the only way to 
shut it down is to neutralize each of its zombies. '2 
1be increasing size and dispersed command structure of botnets make it 
very difficult for law enforcement officers to find and nullify these armies of 
slave computers and their masters.13 BotneLs have evolved into massive. 
amorphous. moving targets that exist transiently in the unbounded regions of 
cyberspace. as the targets of the Estonian attacks learned to their frustration. 
TIle first tentative intrusions began on April 26. 2007. and increased there-
after; by April 29. a flood of data shut down the Estonian Parliament's email 
server.l~ In an apparently related incident on the same day. intruders hacked 
the Reform Party's website and posted a fake political message on it. At that 
point. the director of Estonias Computer Emergency Hesponse Team 
(E-CERT) assembled security experts from the country's Internet service 
providers. banks. government agencies. and police forces; he also reached 
out to government agencies in other countries for assistance in tracking and 
blocking sources of the attack. 
By the end of that first week. the Estonian security forces were having 
some success in frustrating the attack. but they knew the worst was to come. 
The attacks seemed to emanate from Russia. and May 9 was an important 
Russian holid ay, the anniversary of its defeating Nazi Germany and the day 
on which the country honors its fallen soldiers. As I explain below, the 
Estonian defenders knew their attackers intended to shut down the coun-
try's computer network and tri ed to prepare for the worst. TIle E-CEHT direc-
tor urged the members of his security team to try to keep their sites and 
services operating; he was under orders to keep an important government 
site on line, but he was told that other government sites. including the 
Estonian president's website. could be sacrificed. if necessary. 
On May 9, data traffic to Estonian servers increased to thousands of times 
its normal flow; a representative of Estonia's Defense Ministry reported that 
12 See Matt I-lines, Experts: Bo/nets Add Fault Tolerance, InfoWorld (June 7, 2007), 
http://\V\V\v.infoworld.com/article/07 /06/07 /Botnets-get-fault-tolerant_1.lltml. 
l3 See Berinato. Attack of the Bots. supra. 
14 See Lander & Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge afler Dala Siege in Estonia, supra. The informa-
tion in the rest of this paragraph and in much of the next paragraph is taken from Lhis 
same source. 
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sites that usually received 1,000 hits a day were being bombarded with 2,000 
hits a second. IS The traffic increased still further on May 10, shutting down 
Estonia's largest bank. The May attacks also shut down the president's site 
and other government sites and then shifted to civilian targets: newspapers, 
television stations, phone systems, schools, and businesses and other finan-
cial institutions. '6 To maintain at least some internal Internet service, 
Estonian authorities had to block most access to Estonian sites by people 
outside the country; this meant, among other things, that Estonians traveling 
abroad could not access their emai l, bank accounts, or other resources. 
The DDoS attacks began to wane on May 10, but would con tinue sporadi-
cally for weeks. Estonia's largest bank, which lost at least $1 million in the 
attacks, was still dealing with intermittent assaults three weeks after the 
attacks began to subside on May 10. Other victims had similar experiences.' 7 
The last major wave of after attacks finally ended on May 18. 
Security experts in Estonia and abroad agreed that the country's defend-
ers had done an excell ent job of dealing with the attacks. Indeed, some said 
few countries could have defended themselves as skillfuJly. The attacks were, 
though, still devastating in many ways for a "wired" country that likes to call 
itselfE-stonia. ' 8 They revealed how very vulnerable even sophisticated com-
puter systems can be to DDoS attacks; Estonia's defenders were able to react 
as effectively as they did only because of their unusually sophisticated exper-
tise and because their attackers reckJessly put their plans for the attacks 
online. 
At the beginning, as they began to hear rumors about the upcoming 
attacks, Estonian security experts found detailed plans for the attacks posted 
in RUSSian-language forums and chat groupS.19 Those who would become 
their country's first line of defense in the May cyber assauJts watched the 
15 See Steven Lee Myers. Estonia Computers Blitzed, Possibly by the Russians. New York 
Times (May 19. 2007). http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/05/19/world/europe/19russia.html? 
ex= 133722 7200& en =4817 e43658c91382& ei=5088. 
16 See Lander & Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia. supra; Myers, 
Estonia Computers Blitzed. Possibly by the Russians, supra. 
17 See Tony Halpin, EstoniaAccuses Russia oJ· Waging Cyber War,"Times Online (May 17. 2007). 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/articleI802959.ece. 
18 See Myers. Estonia Computers Blitzed, supra. At the time of the attacks. in Estonia you 
could "pay for your parking meter via cell phone, access free Wi-Fi at every gas station. 
and ... vote in national elections from your Pc." Cyrus Farivar. Cyberwar 1: What the 
Attacks on Estonia Have Taught Us about Online Combat, Slate (May 22, 2007). http://www. 
slate.com/id/2166749/. 
19 See Lander & Markoff: Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia, supra. 
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attacks being orchestrated online in real-tim e, which gave them an obvious 
advantage when it came time to respond. 
Afterward, Estonian authorities blamed Russia for the attacks, which they 
referred to as "cyberwarfare:'2o The Eston ians based that allegation on several 
factors, one of which was that the attacks seemed to have been launched in 
retaliation for the governmen t's removing a statue of a World War II Soviet 
solider from a park in Tallinn not long before the attacks began and not long 
before the May 9 holiday. (Officials had expected the removal to trigger street 
protests from the country's Russian-speaking minority.) Estonian au thorities 
also noted that Russian-language sites were used to plan the attacks and 
claimed that a member of the Russian security service was "one of the mas-
terminds" of the attacks.21 Finall y, the Estonian authorities claimed that 
security experts analyzing the DDoS attacks allegedly traced Internet 
addresses used in the attacks to Russian government agencies, including the 
office of President Vlad imi r Putin.n 
The Eston ians also relied on an inferential circumstance in condemning 
Russia for the attacks. The inferential circumstance was the premise that the 
attacks were of such magnitude that mere civilians could not have carried 
them out; according to thi s theory, only a state could have been responsible for 
the attacks.23 TIle Russian govern ment vehemently denied any .involvement in 
them, a denial many outside Estonia found credible. Some foreign experts said 
it might be impossible ever to ascertain precisely who was responsible for the 
attacks. As one put it, "'The Internet is perfect for plausible deniability: "2'1 
As time passed, even the Estonian authorities abandoned the idea that the 
attacks were Russian cyberwarfare.2:' By June, Estonia's prime minister was 
describing them as '''criminal activity '" and asking the Russi an government 
20 See Halpin, EstoniaAccuses Russia oj"Waging Cyber War,"supra (Estonia's Foreign Ivli nister 
"accused the Kremli n" of being directly involved in the attacks). 
21 See Ian Traynor. Russia Accused oj Unleashing Cyben var to Disable Esl.onia. Guardian 
Unlimited (May 17. 2007). http://www.guarcii an.co.uk/russia/article/0 .. 2081438.00.html. 
Other experts "were divided" as to whet.h er it was possible to icl entify those involved in 
the attacks. See id. 
22 See Lancler & Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia. supra.. 
23 See Traynor. Russia Accused of Unleashi ng Cyberwar to Disable Estonia. su.pra.. 
24 Lander & Markoff. Digil.al Fears Emerge afler Dala Siege in Estonia. supra (quoting Gadi 
Evron. Israeli computer security expert who investigated the attacks). 
25 See John Schwartz. When Computers AUack, New York Times (june 24. 2007). hltp://www. 
nytimes. com/2007 /06/24/ weeki n rev iew /24sc hwa rt z. h tm l?ex= J 183694400& 
en=bb2b9a4cla7bfc84&ei=5070. 
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for assistance in finding those responsible.26 And the international commu-
nity had come to the sobering realization that the Estonian attacks were not. 
after all. something beyond the capacity of mere civilians. The technology 
and techniques used in the attacks were not new. and they did not involve 
tactics that only a nation-state would be able to implementP 
The Estonian attacks are instructive for our purposes not merely because 
they illustrate the kind of evils that are emerging from the dark side of cyber-
space. More important for this discussion. they demonstrate how evolving 
threats emerging from cyberspace challenge the conceptual categories we 
have so far used to avoid chaos and main tain order in our societies and in our 
lives. What was never ambiguous was that the country ofEstonia was attacked. 
repeatedly and maliciously. What was. and remains. ambiguous is what kind 
of attack it was. and who was responsible. The two issues-the nature of the 
attack and the identity of the attackers-are actually interrelated. 
To understand why. let us consider the possibilities. The first set of possi-
bilities goes to the nature of the attack and encompasses three alternatives: 
cyberwarfare. cyberterrorism. or cybercrime. We will parse these three 
alternatives in detail in the next chapter. so here I will simply note the basic 
distinctions among them. 
Cyberwarfare. like its real-world28 counterpart. consists of a military con-
flict between two nation-states. At a minimum. therefore. for the attacks to 
constitute cyberwarfare. they would have to have been launched by another 
country. such as Russia. which ultimately proved to be blameless. No evidence 
ever pointed to any other country's being responsible for the attacks. 
26 Estonia Asks For Russia Help to Find Web Criminals. Relfters (June 6. 2007). hup:/ /www. 
javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=50606. A few weeks after the attacks ended. some 
non-Estonian experts concluded they had been launched by globally coordinated political 
activists. See Michelle Price. Political Activists Blamed for Russian Cyber Assaults. 
Information Age (june 4. 2007). http://www.information-age.com/infologlia_today/2007 / 
06/political_activists_blamed_for.html. 
27 See Schwartz. When Computers Attack. supra. 
28 In this and succeeding chapters. I use the term "real-world" to denote the default realit)' 
we inhabit, i.e .• the reality that is not cyberspace. In call ing it the "real-world; J am not 
implying that what goes on in cyberspace is not "real; either in terms of our immediate 
experience of it or in terms of the consequences activity in cyberspace may have for our 
external environment. I use the term "real-world" to denote the physical. tangible envi-
ronment in which we spend the better part of our lives. Here. "real" has the essential ly the 
same connotation it has when coupled with "property"; in the law. "real property" is 
understood as being something tangible and physical. as opposed to intangible commod-
ities such as rights. See. e.g .• "Abatement and Hevival" § 150. Corpus Juris Secundum 
(Thomson West 2007). 
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Cybercrime. like its real-world counterpart. consists of private citizens' 
intentionally engaging in act ivi ty that threatens a societ-y's ability to main-
tain internal order. Therefore. for the attacks to constitute cybercrime. they 
would have to have been launched by individuals who were pursuing typical 
criminal goals. such as enriching themselves through theft or extortion. 
There was never. however. any evidence that the attacks were undertaken for 
the purpose of theft. extortion. or any of the motives typical of mere crimi-
nals. The attackers seemed bent on destruction for destruction's sake. and 
that brings us to the third and final possibility. 
Cyberterrorism. like its real-world counterpart. consists of private citizens' 
engaging in terrorist activity. Empiri cally. terrorism is often indistinguishable 
from criminal activity because. like criminals. terrorists cause death and injury 
to people and damage to property; the distinction between the two conse-
quently li es not in the conduct involved or the resul t achieved but in the moti-
vations for the conduct and for its result. Terrorists act to promote ideological 
principles. not to enrich or otherwise benefit themselves as individuals. 
Therefore. for the Estoruan attacks to constitute cyberterrorism. individuals 
who sought to promote ideological principles would have lau nched them. in 
this instance by shutting down various websites and generally crippling the 
cou ntry's Internet access. The fact that the attacks apparently sought destruc-
tion and disruption for their own sake inferen tially supports the conclusion 
they were cyberterrorism . but terrorists usually take responsibility for their 
actions. That. after all . is the point: Terrorism-including. presumably. cyber-
terrorism-is havoc for political reasons. Unless the political motives for a 
terrorist attack are acknowledged and publicized. the attack has no purpose. 
And no one ever attr ibuted political motivations to the Estonian attacks. 
Where does this leave us? It leaves us with the new reality of a wired 
world. Estoni a will never know who was responsible for the attacks or why 
they were launched. something that is not possible in the unwired. physical 
world. In the physical world. when a country is at war. it knows it is at war 
and. most likely. with whom. So when the German army invaded Poland in 
1939. Poland knew it was at war wiLh Germany; and when the Japanese air 
force bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941. the United States knew it was at war 
with]apan. 
Activity in the physical world is visible and therefore transparent. The 
immed iate visibility of armies invading and planes bombing translates into 
war. the responsibility for which is usually also apparent. Murder. theft. rape. 
and all the other crim es we have t raditionally encountered generally reveal 
themselves as what they are upon commission, though their authorship may 
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remain obscure, at least for a time. The same is true for terrorism: When two 
planes flew into the World Trade Center, it was immediately apparent this 
was terrorism, not war, not crime, and not accident. Nation-states do not use 
commercial airliners to wage war, and criminals do not engage in destruc-
tion for the sake of destruction. Once the nature of the attack was clear, the 
focus shifted to identifying those responsible through a combination ofinfer-
ence and crediting the eventual claims of responsibility. 
None of this is true for conduct vectored through cyberspace. In the next 
few chapters, we will explore in detail why and how cyberspace erodes, and 
eliminates, our ability to identify the nature of an attack and/or the identity of 
those responsible. The Estonian episode was far from an isolated event; other 
countries, including the United States, have been the objects of similar, though 
rather more targeted, attacks. In each instance, as we shall see, the nature of 
the attack remained ambiguous and the identity of those responsible was 
never ascertainable. 
This undeniable reality is a matter of great import for all of us-for private 
citizens and governments alike-because it undermines the conceptual, 
legal, and practical strategies we rely on to defeat chaos and maintain order 
within and among our societies. We have never been able to eliminate chaos 
in the real, physical world, but we have learned how to keep it under enough 
control that it does not threaten the fabric of our lives. 
Cyberspace changes that. The problem we confront is that the tactics we 
use to control chaos in the real, physical world are generally ineffective when it 
comes to the cyberworld. If the chaos evolving in the cyberworld stayed in that 
virtual environment, we would have little or no reason to be concerned; we 
could simply quarantine cyberspace and isolate the problem. Unfortunately, 
what happens in the cyberworld does not stay in the cyberworld; it migrates 
out into our world because cyberspace is not a true external ity. It is simply a 
vector for human activity, both good and bad. Cyberspace lets the worst of 
everyplace leak out into anyplace, and that is part of our problem. 
As we shall see, the concepts and strategies we use to maintain order in 
the physical world are all based on the concept of "place;' of geographical 
territory. Our notions of security are enclave notions; we control chaos by 
limiting its ability to manifest itselfin a particular area. Our world is made up 
of a patchwork of enclaves in which chaos is being controlled more or less 
successfully. We have complicated rules and strategies for control li ng chaos 
with in and among these enclaves. And, as we shall see, all of those rules and 
strategies, even the ones designed to control chaos among enclaves, are 
based on this notion of sovereign spaces. 
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Cyberspace presents us with what is, in essence, a fourth (or maybe fifth) 
dimension-a behavioral dimension rather than a spatial dimension. 
Cyberspace is not "real" in any tangible sense, but as we saw with the Estonian 
attacks, it can have very real effects in the spatial world we inhabit. But 
because cyberspace is neither a "real" place nor is situated in a "real:' tangible 
space, it is not subject to the terrestrial rules and strategies we use to control 
chaos with in and among our physical enclaves. 
The individuals whose conduct manifests itself through cyberspace are, of 
course, located in a terrestrial enclave, which can mean they are subject to 
these rules and strategies. Unfortunately, as we saw with the Estonian attacks, 
this is not inevitable: Ifwe cannot identify those responsible for chaos ema-
natir.g from cyberspace, we cannot subject them to the terrestrial rules and 
strategies we use to discourage this type of activity. And as we shall see, even 
if we can identify the perpetrators they may still be beyond the reach of these 
measures; they may, for example, be operating from Country A, which 
discourages internal chaos but has no problem with allowing its residents to 
prey on those residing in Countries C-Z. 
In the next several chapters, I explain in detail precisely why the terres-
trial rules and strategies are not effective for conduct vectored through 
cyberspace. The problem, essentially, is that they assume visible, identifiable 
activity. So, if we identify activity as war, we use our war rules and strategies 
to deal with it; if we identify activity as crime, we use our crime rules and 
strategies to deal with it; and the same is also true if we identify activity as 
terrorism because we currently treat terrorism as a variety of crime.z9 As I 
explain in the next chapters, the way we control the incidence of chaos is to 
react to outbreaks of war, crime, and terrorism in a way that is designed to 
discourage such events. 
As we have seen, this system breaks down when neither the nature of the 
activit)' nor the identity of those responsible is apparent. Not only do we not 
know whom to target with our reactive efforts, we do not know what kind of 
reaction is appropriate. The Estonian authorities believed they were engaged 
in cyberwarfare with Russia, but their belief did not rise to the level of 
certainty that would have warranted an oflensive counterattack with real-
world weapons. Their belief was, apparen tly, erroneous, but what if it had not 
been? What if Russia had really been engaging in cyberwarfare against 
Estonia? What if (hypothetically) the attacks were the first of a series of 
29 'n,is assumes we are able to identify those who are responsible for the war. crime, or 
terrorism, which is usuaUy true for activity in the physical world. 
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cyberwarfare assaults by Russia? Uncertain wheLher it is, in fact, at war, 
Estonia passively tr ies to fend off the never-ending, increasingly sophisti-
cated attacks until its economy and society are so weakened they collapse, 
at which point Russia kind ly offers to send troops to stabilize the situation. 
That scenario may seem absurd, but it probably is not. As we will see in 
later chapters, countries are preparing for cyberwarfare, and it appears cyber-
warfare will look nothing like its real-world counterpart. Real-world warfare is 
overt and destructive; cyberwarfare will be subtle and erosive. China, for 
example, has already ar ticulated plans for cyberwarfare that involve using 
civilians and civilian entities in attacking foreign corporate and fi nancial insti-
tutions. In the real, physical world, warfare is like professional football: only 
the deSignated players participate. In the cyberworld, warfare will be much 
more catholic; civi lians are likely to be prime players and prime targets. 
That creates at least the potential for confl ating war, crime, and terrorism. 
As we all know, crime and terrorism are civil-civilian on civilian affairs-while 
war is the exclusive province of the mili tary. Armies, which are otten composed 
of erstwhile civilians, fight wars; "pure" civilians do not. Civilians are, of course, 
caught up in warfare, but we have developed an elaborate set of rules for how 
"noncombatants" are to be treated; and we refer to unavoidable harms to civil-
ians as "collateral damage" because it is a byproduct of the purely military 
effort. 
In cyberwarfare, it seems, there may be no room for noncombatants. And 
this brings me back to the point I made earlier: If civi lians are legitimate 
targets in cyberwarfare, then how can a country tell whether it is dealing 
with war, crime, or terrori sm? The distinctions are of profound importance 
in the world in which we currently live because they determine . .. every-
thing. 1hey determine who will respond to an attack and how they will 
respond. We do not, for example, use nuclear devices or other military weap-
ons against bank robbers or terrorists. In the United States, anyway, our law 
bars the military from participating in civilian law enforcement; we have an 
absolute, un breach able partition between civil and mili tary threat response 
strategies. And we, like every other functioning country, have a carefully cali-
brated hierarchy of threats and an equally careful ly calibrated hierarchy of 
threat responses for the real world. 
Because it is becoming increas ingly apparent that these threat and 
response hierarchies are not effective against cyberthreats, we must develop a 
new approach for cyberthreats. We must devise p rinciples and strategies that 
are effective in this new threat envi ronment. Logically, the cyberthreat strate-
gies can either supplement our real-world threat and response hierarchies, 
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or replace them. If we decide cyberthreats are merely a new and distinct 
category of threats-an analogue of crime, war, and terror-then the approach 
we devise ,"!ill be additive; that is, it will supplement the principles and strate-
gies we employ for these traditional, real-world threats. If, on the other hand, 
we decide that cyberthreats are not a distinct category of threats but are, 
instead, evolving variations of the three traditional threat categori es, then we 
will either need to upgrade our cu rrent discrete threat and response hierar-
ch ies with new expanded versions or implement, instead, an entirely new, 
holistic approach to contro ll ing chaos omine and online. 
That is what this book is about. I am not p resumptuous enough to attempt 
to resolve all of these issues here. My goal is rather to explain why they are 
issues we must confront and to ofter some modest suggestions as to how we 
might go about resolving them. Though that may sound unambitious, it actu-
ally is not. The law-abiding, stable societies most of us enjoy are the product 
of centuri es of struggle against chaos in its various forms. Some of the meth-
ods we employ to deal with chaos are ancient; others, such as professional 
policing, are relatively new. All, however, are well rooted in hi story, tradition, 
and culture; we are so accustomed to having the military deal with war and a 
professional police force deal with crime and terrorism that it is difficult for 
us to imagine anything different. What we have seems "right"- inevitable. 
And so it may be. But because what we have is clearly not enough for the 
world we are beginning to confront, we need to think about what we can do 
differently to make that world as safe as possible for us and for those who 
come after us. And that is what we do here. 
The next several chapters parse the real-world threat categories and the 
principles and strategies we have devised to deal \vith them. They also 
demonstrate why and how these principles and strategies are not effective 
against cyberthreats. We then consider how societies can improve their abil-
ity to control cyberthreats without encroaching on individualliberLies or the 
constructive anarchy of cyberspace. 
Before we begin, I need to clarify one point: Later, particularly Chapter 7, 
J \viII analyze what I cal l "cyb3rchaos":J()-the potential disruption attributable 
to new, elusive threats emerging from cyberspace. When I discuss this potential 
disruption, I by no means intend to suggest that we are on the brink of a com-
plete social and cultural meltdown. As far as I can tell, the Cyber-Vandals are 
not at the gate and we are not the Roman Empire in the early fifth century AD. 
30 I define I:hi term more precisely in Chapter 7. 
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But meltdown is not the only hazard that evolved civilizations face; contuma-
cious, erosive threats can ultimately prove to be, if not equally devastating, 
devastating enough to present cause for concern. The British Empire, after all, 
never fell; it declined, to a shadow of what it had been. 
In 2004, three years before I write th is, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation 
estimated that cybercrime cost U.S. citizens about $400 billion,~ 1 and in July 
of 2007, FBI Director Robert Mueller said he believes only about one-th ird of 
the cybercrime in the United States is actually reported to the FBI.32 I have 
heard cybercrime cost estimates that are much, much higher than Lhe figure 
cited for 2004; and as everyone involved with cybercrime knows, it has dra-
matically increased in the last three years and will continue to increase 
unless and until governments begin to create reali stic disincentives for 
cybercriminals. I also believe, based on reliable anecdotal evidence, that the 
reporting rate for cybercrime in the United States, anyway, is much less than 
Director Mueller estimates. As we will see, victimized businesses do not 
report cybercrime to law enforcement for many reasons, and I suspect simi-
lar forces often influence individual victims, as well. 
So, while LwenL),-first-century western civili zation is obviously not on the 
brink of a Cyber-Decline and Fall, cybercrime and other threats emanating 
from cyberspace are, in my opinion, a very legitimate cause for concern. The 
reason I am writing this is because I believe the problem is solvable, but not 
if we continue trying to use old solutions for new evils. 
31 See Alice Lipowicz,Rentable Crime Networks Latest Security Threat, Washington Technology 
(July 5. 2005). http://www.washingtontechnology.com/online/l_l/26546-l.html. 
32 FBI Director Encourages Businesses to Report Cybercrime, Securi ty Solutions (.July 10. 2007). 
http://securitysolutions.com/ news/security _fbi_director _encourages/. 
